Bridgen v Hancock [2026] EWCA Civ 991
In this article we review a Court of Appeal judgment in respect of defamation under the UK Defamation Act 2013.
On the 29th of July the Court of Appeal granted a summary judgment for Matt Hancock, who was sued for libel over comments he made regarding a tweet posted by former Conservative MP Andrew Bridgen.
The judgment is significant for providing clarity on the scope of section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013, otherwise known as the defence of ‘honest opinion’.
Background
On the 11th of January 2023 Mr Bridgen posted a Tweet with a link to an article by Dr Joshua Guetzkow which reported on adverse effects people had received from Covid vaccinations, alongside the statement: “As one consultant cardiologist said to me this is the biggest crime against humanity since the Holocaust.” This prompted Mr Hancock to respond at Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) and post a Tweet shortly after containing a video of the exchange at PMQs and the comments:
“The disgusting and dangerous antisemitic, anti-vax, anti-scientific conspiracy theories spouted by a sitting MP this morning are unacceptable and have absolutely no place in our society.”
Mr Bridgen sued for libel, only regarding the use of the term ‘antisemitic’.
Issues
- Whether it was important to review the responses of other commentators to Mr Bridgen’s Tweet.
- Whether there needed to be fuller evidential exploration to identify the parameters of what can be an honestly held belief.
- Whether there needed to be a fuller argument.
- Whether there was an overlap between evidence relevant to the objective honesty criteria and with a triable issue under s. 3(5).
- Whether Mr Hancock was entitled to rely on facts regarding the Holocaust or the pandemic.
- Whether authoritative definitions may show that the opinion was untenable.
- Whether the presumption of falsity is a reason the case should be sent to trial.
- Whether Mr Bridgen’s use of the word ‘since’ may be fatal to the defence.
Held
- The test for honest belief is not reliant on evidence of commentators outside of the court.
- The limits of the beliefs a person may hold are to be determined by the court objectively; external definitions of antisemitism cannot be used to show the belief to be untenable.
- No further argument is needed and cannot be a reason to decline a summary judgment.
- There is no triable issue under s.3(5).
- Regard should not be given to a defendant’s purposes when deciding whether an honest person could hold the opinion.
- Mr Hancock is entitled to rely on facts regarding the Holocaust and the pandemic.
- Authoritative definitions of antisemitism cannot be used to show the belief to be untenable.
- The presumption of falsity does not apply.
- Use of the word ‘since’ is not fatal to the defence.
Commentary
The judgment highlights the objective standard for the defence of ‘honest opinion’ and clarifies s. 3(4). The Court of Appeal (Judges: Warby LJ, Whipple and King LJJ, all in agreement) found that the court at first instance was “mistaken” (para 38) in assuming that the question of whether a person honestly believes the statement they make is measured against the evidence of commentators outside of the court. As Warby LJ stated in paragraph 39 of the judgment, the matter turns on “argument not evidence”, reasoning that both pragmatism and principle is reason for this exclusion (para 41).
Furthermore, the court emphasised that there is a low bar to confirm whether a belief is honest; Warby LJ asserts it is incorrect to give regard to “a defendant’s purposes” when deciding “whether an honest person could hold the opinion which the defendant expressed” (para 51), and that there is a heightened standard for proving malice under s. 3(5) (para 68). Therefore, ‘reasonableness’ of the opinion is not the test in itself. Moreover, Warby LJ acknowledges that while Mr Bridgen’s Tweet considers the Holocaust to be an atrocity and “a crime against humanity”, the issue “is not whether the Bridgen Tweet was antisemitic but whether an honest person could (however unreasonably or even irrationally) have held the opinion that it was.” (para 60) Therefore, the statement’s accuracy is irrelevant. This point is further emphasised by the court’s finding that the presumption of falsity does not apply because it was “a defamatory statement of opinion”; Mr Hancock need not prove “the truth of that statement” (para 58).
The judgment also sheds light on the evidence that can be used when judging the opinion under s.3. Alongside the assertion regarding commentators, the court also found that further ‘evidential exploration’ was not necessary. Warby LJ asserted (para 48) that “The outer limits of the opinions an honest person could hold […] are to be identified by the court objectively”. Thus, while ‘an honest opinion’ for the purpose of s.3(3) requires a ‘basis’ to which the opinion alludes, the opinion need not be wholly justifiable when tested against all evidence. The evidence that is relevant, the court found to be facts about the Holocaust and/or pandemic as these plainly hold a bearing on the forming of the opinion. In contrast, definitions of antisemitism prepared by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance are not relevant. Therefore, the evidential inaccuracy of an opinion does not satisfy s. 3(5) to prove that an opinion was dishonestly held. This reaffirms the low threshold to confirm ‘honesty’.
See the judgment here: https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/andrew-bridgen-v-matt-hancock/
Taylor Hampton is a specialist media law firm, with expertise in defamation and privacy law matters. You can contact our enquiries team on 0207 427 5970 or at enquiries@taylorhampton.co.uk
Disclaimer: This article provides general guidance only and does not constitute legal advice. Civil procedure rules and case law can change. Always seek professional legal advice tailored to your specific situation before acting.